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Note 
CONNICK v. THOMPSON: UNCLEAR MOTIVES  
BEHIND A MISGUIDED RESULT 
CLAUDE NICOLAS∗
In Connick v. Thompson,
 
1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
refined its jurisprudence in the area of municipal liability under the 
failure-to-train theory.2  The Court held that a district attorney’s office 
could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train 
where the plaintiff did not prove a pattern of Brady violations.3  The 
Court determined further that a municipality’s failure to train prose-
cutors on Brady violations was not an obvious circumstance that was 
likely to deprive defendants of constitutional rights.4
In so holding, the Court deprived John Thompson of any legal 
relief after he had spent fourteen years on death row and was nearly 
executed for a crime he did not commit.  As a matter of legal 
precedent, the Court failed to establish what would constitute a pat-
tern of Brady violations sufficient to trigger municipal liability for vi-
olating 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
  
5
 
Copyright © 2012 by Claude Nicolas. 
  Further, the Court erred in ignoring the 
trial record, which detailed the many Brady violations the prosecutors 
committed and, because of this error, the Court improperly disturbed 
the jury’s reasonable conclusion that untrained prosecutors’ Brady vi-
∗ Claude Nicolas is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law, where he is a staff member of the Maryland Law Review.  The 
author would like to thank Professor David Gray for his wisdom, Jack Blum, Esther 
Houseman, Kristina Foehrkolb, and all of the many editors that made this Note much bet-
ter than it was in its infancy.  Lastly, the author would like to thank his wife, and fellow law 
student, Diona Howard-Nicolas and his son Claude Nicolas Jr. for keeping him grounded. 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 2. See id. at 1356 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether a district attorney’s office 
may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train . . . .”). 
 3. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356.  A Brady violation refers to the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Brady v. Maryland that “evidence favorable to an accused on request may not be 
suppressed by prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 4. See id. at 1361 (finding that the failure to train prosecutors on Brady violations was 
not the type of obvious circumstance likely to deprive citizens of constitutional rights that 
the Court found in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). 
 5. See infra Part IV.B. 
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olations would likely deprive defendants of their constitutional 
rights.6  The Court should have ensured that municipalities would 
more vigilantly train their prosecutors about Brady violations by im-
posing liability on the District Attorney where, as in this case, the 
need for training was so obvious and the failure to train prosecutors 
about Brady was highly likely to deprive defendants of their constitu-
tional rights.7  Finally, the Court should have held that prior Brady vi-
olations would put a prosecutor’s office on notice for the need to im-
plement more training, regardless of differences in the types of 
evidence prosecutors withheld in those prior violations.8
I.  THE CASE 
   
On April 12, 1985, John Thompson was convicted of attempted 
armed robbery, and on May 8, 1985, Thompson was convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to death.9  Due to the unrelated at-
tempted armed robbery conviction, Thompson decided not to testify 
at his murder trial,10 fearing that the prosecution would have used the 
attempted armed robbery conviction to attack his credibility.11  In 
state court, Thompson exhausted all available post-conviction relief, 
and on February 27, 1997, filed a habeas corpus action in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.12  The dis-
trict court denied Thompson’s habeas corpus petition and the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the denial.13
In April 1999, Louisiana set Thompson’s execution date for May 
20 of the same year.
 
14  Prior to Thompson’s scheduled execution, 
however, a private investigator discovered that prosecutors failed to 
disclose a crime lab report in Thompson’s attempted armed robbery 
case.15
 
 6. See infra Part IV.C. 
  The lab report indicated that the perpetrator of the armed 
 7. See infra Part IV.C. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. Thompson v. Connick, No. Civ.A.03-2045, 2005 WL 3541035, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 
15, 2005), aff’d, 553 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(per curiam), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 10. Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 11. State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 555 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 12. Thompson, 2005 WL 3541035, at *1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
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robbery had type B blood.16  Thompson had type O blood.17  The Dis-
trict Attorney’s office and Thompson sought a stay of execution, and 
after an evidentiary hearing the trial court vacated Thompson’s at-
tempted armed robbery conviction.18  Thompson then sought post-
conviction relief regarding his murder conviction.19  On October 26, 
2000, the trial court reversed Thompson’s death sentence, but did not 
grant him a new murder trial.20  Thompson then appealed and on Ju-
ly 17, 2002, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed his 
murder conviction and sentence, and granted Thompson a new tri-
al.21  The court determined that because the unrelated attempted 
armed robbery conviction was improper, Thompson was denied the 
right to testify on his own behalf.22  The court concluded that but for 
the improper attempted armed robbery conviction, Thompson would 
have testified in his murder trial.23  In 2003, Thompson was retried for 
murder and found not guilty.24
On July 16, 2003, Thompson filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against District At-
torney Harry F. Connick; Louisiana prosecutors Eric Dubelier, James 
Williams, and Eddie Jordan; and the Orleans Parish District Attor-
ney’s Office under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
 
25  The only 
claim that was tried before a jury was Thompson’s claim under Sec-
tion 1983 for the wrongful suppression of exculpatory evidence in vi-
olation of Brady.26
 
 16. Id. 
  The jury found that District Attorney Harry Con-
nick was deliberately indifferent to the need to train his prosecutors 
on the constitutional requirement to disclose evidence favorable to a 
 17. Id. 
 18. Thompson, 2005 WL 3541035, at *1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. State v. Thompson,  825 So. 2d 552, 555–56 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  
 23. Id. at 557. 
 24. Thompson, 2005 WL 3541035, at *1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).  Thompson also claimed malicious prosecution under Louisi-
ana state law, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(3) and initiated a direct action claim against several insurance companies 
pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute § 22:655.  Complaint at 24–31, Thompson v. Con-
nick, 2005 WL 3541035, No. Civ.A.03-2045 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2005). 
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criminal defendant.27  The jury awarded Thompson $14 million in 
damages and the defendants appealed.28
In a panel opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury’s damages award.
 
29  The court con-
cluded that Thompson established sufficiently that it was obvious that 
Brady training was necessary and that Connick’s failure to train his 
prosecutors was very likely to cause those prosecutors to violate 
Thompson’s constitutional rights.30  The court also held that no pat-
tern of similar violations was necessary to put Connick on notice that 
Brady training was needed.31  Further, the court stressed that where 
there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury finding, the court 
could not disturb that finding.32  Consequently, the court concluded 
that a reasonable jury could have determined that Connick’s failure 
to train caused prosecutors to violate Thompson’s constitutional 
rights.33  Lastly, the court found no reversible error in the trial court’s 
jury instructions on deliberate indifference.34
Reviewing the case again, the Fifth Circuit granted an en banc re-
hearing of the appeal, thereby vacating the panel opinion.
 
35  In an 
opinion that produced no majority, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision by a tie vote.36  Fearing that, in the absence of 
immunity, the independence, integrity, and efficiency of prosecutori-
al offices would be jeopardized, Chief Judge Edith H. Jones would 
have reversed the district court’s decision.37
 
 27. Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-2045, 2007 WL 1200826, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 
2007), aff’d, 553 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(per curiam), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).  
   Judge Edith Brown Cle-
ment would have reversed the district court’s decision because a mu-
nicipality could be held liable for the individual constitutional torts of 
its employees only under very limited circumstances pursuant to Bra-
 28. Connick, 578 F.3d at 297. 
 29. Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 869 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 578 F.3d 293 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 30. Id. at 854. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 856–57 (quoting Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 296–97 (5th Cir. 
2005)). 
 33. Id. at 856. 
 34. Id. at 863. 
 35. Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam), 
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 293–95 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (discussing several reasons for reversing 
the lower court’s ruling). 
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dy.38  According to Judge Clement, Thompson failed to prove causa-
tion between the prosecutors’ lack of training under Connick’s super-
vision and their constitutional violation in not turning over the lab 
report because they did not know they had a legal obligation to dis-
close such evidence under Brady.39
Judge Prado concurred in the judgment and criticized the dis-
senters for ignoring the deference reviewing courts must give to a 
jury’s verdict.
   
40  Further, Judge Prado stressed that where, as in this 
case, the jury’s verdict is reasonably supported by the evidence, the 
reviewing court must uphold that verdict.41  Appellate courts, there-
fore, would be required to view evidence and make inferences “in fa-
vor of the jury’s verdict.”42
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to 
decide whether a district attorney’s office could be held liable under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train based on one Brady violation.
  
43
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
In Connick, the Court grappled with the legal test for establishing 
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a district attorney’s al-
leged failure to train his prosecutors on Brady violations.  In address-
ing Section 1983 liability, the Court has always had to determine 
which municipal actions would open the door to liability, and what a 
party seeking to hold a municipality liable would have to prove in or-
der to prevail.44  The Court was initially reluctant to find that Con-
gress’s intent in adopting Section 1983 was to assign potential liability 
against government bodies.45  Nevertheless, the Court ultimately in-
terpreted the sectiom to open government bodies to liability46 and de-
fined the narrow routes of attack available to plaintiffs seeking to hold 
municipalities liable for constitutional violations.47
 
 38. Id. at 296 (Clement, J., dissenting). 
  In doing so, the 
Court stressed the necessity of establishing causation between the 
municipality’s actions and the alleged constitutional harm, as well as 
evidence of culpability and not mere negligence on the part of the 
 39. Id. at 308–-09. 
 40. Id. at 311–12 (Prado, J., concurring). 
 41. Id. at 312. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
 44. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 45. See infra Part II.A. 
 46. See infra Part II.B.  
 47. See infra Part II.C. 
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municipality.48  Further, the Court later fashioned a deliberate indif-
ference standard for municipal liability where the municipality’s al-
leged failure to train its employees caused a constitutional harm.49  
While the Connick Court’s main focus was Section 1983 liability, Jus-
tice Thomas’s discussion of Brady in the context of prosecutorial train-
ing warrants an analysis of the Court’s own difficulty understanding 
Brady.50  Given the Connick Court’s insistence that Brady violations did 
not establish any obvious need for training, this Part will also offer a 
reflection on the tumultuous history of Brady jurisprudence, describ-
ing the Court’s struggle to paint a cohesive picture of Brady.51
A.  Initially, the Court Determined that Municipalities Were Not “People” 
for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Purposes  
 
Title 42 U.S.C § 1983, which “confer[s] jurisdiction on the feder-
al courts to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,”52
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law . . . .
 pro-
vides in pertinent part:  
53
Before Section 1983 was codified, it was known as Section 1 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
 
54  In Monroe v. Pape,55
 
 48. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 the Supreme Court, 
for the first time, analyzed whether the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
 49. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 50. See infra Part II.D. 
 51. See infra Part II.D. 
 52. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 681 (1977) (citing Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006))).  
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 54. Monell, 436 U.S. at 664.   
 55. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436, U.S. 658 
(1978). 
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opened the door to liability against municipalities.56  After thoroughly 
exhuming the legislative history of Section 1983, the Court decided in 
Monroe57 that civil liability for violations of Section 1983 did not apply 
to municipalities.58  The Court found Congress’s rejection of what be-
came known as the “Sherman Amendment” dispositive of Congress’s 
intent to exclude municipalities from Section 1983 liability.59  Senator 
John Sherman of Ohio proposed an amendment to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 that would have held the citizens of municipalities liable 
for acts of violence done against any harmed individual.60
The House of Representatives rejected the amendment,
   
61 be-
cause in its judgment Congress did not have constitutional authority 
to “impose any obligation upon county and town organizations.”62  
Faced with what it viewed as Congress’s antagonism toward some no-
tion of municipal liability, the Court did not place municipalities with-
in the ambit of Section 1983.63  It is important to note, however, that 
the Court highlighted, but declined to address, the policy argument 
that municipal liability would cause governments to actively police 
constitutional violations against citizens.64
 
 56. Id. at 172.  Section 1979 came onto the books as section 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 
April 20, 1871.  Id. at 171.  The Ku Klux Act was also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.  
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 665.  This act was later codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id.   
 
 57. Id.  Thirteen police officers allegedly broke into Monroe’s house with neither a 
search warrant nor an arrest warrant.  Id. at 169.  The officers then “ransacked” the house 
and took Monroe to the police station where they detained him for ten hours without tak-
ing him before a magistrate.  Id.  The officers denied him a phone call to his family or at-
torney, and subsequently released Monroe without criminal charges.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 187.  See supra note 59, for the history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
 59. Monell, 436 U.S. at 188–91. 
 60. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 663 (1871). The Sherman Amendment read, in 
pertinent part: 
[I]f such offense was committed to deprive any person of any right conferred 
upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or 
punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude, in every such case the inhabitants of the county, city, or 
parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable to pay 
full compensation to the person or persons damnified by such offense . . . .  And 
execution may be issued on a judgment rendered in such suit and may be levied 
upon any property . . . of any person in said county, city, or parish, and the said 
county, city, or parish may recover the full amount of such judgment, costs and 
interest, from any person or persons engaged as principal or accessory . . . . 
Id. 
 61. Id. at 725. 
 62. Id. at 804. 
 63. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191 (1961).  See supra note 59, for the history of § 1983. 
 64. See id. (noting that “municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs responsible 
defendants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police level[,]” 
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B.   The Court Determined That a Municipality Could Be Liable Where It 
Acted Unconstitutionally by Implementing an Official Municipal 
Policy 
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City65 the Court 
reexamined the legislative history of Section 198366 and determined 
that its decision in Monroe v. Pape “incorrectly equated the ‘obligation’ 
[that the Sherman Amendment imposed on municipalities] with ‘civil 
liability.’”67  The Court overruled Monroe68 and found that, contrary to 
what it had believed to be true in Monroe, the Sherman Amendment 
was not an amendment to Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.69  
Instead, Senator Sherman intended Section 1 to be an amendment to 
Section 7,70 the final section of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.71  In fact, 
Section 1—now 42 U.S.C. § 1983—was not even a subject of debate in 
the committee conference that produced a draft of the Sherman 
Amendment.72
The Court reasoned that since Section 1983 merely granted ju-
risdiction to federal courts to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—“a situation precisely analogous to the grant of diversity 
jurisdiction under which the Contract Clause was enforced against 
municipalities”—even those who voted against the Sherman Amend-
ment would find Section 1983 suits against municipalities constitu-
tional.
 
73  This revelation that the Court previously misunderstood the 
legislative history of Section 1983 compelled the Court to conclude 
that Congress actually did seek to include municipalities within the 
ambit of Section 1983.74
 
and declining to “reach those policy considerations”) (citing Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for 
Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 514 (1955)). 
  Therefore, plaintiffs could sue local gov-
ernment entities under Section 1983 for all legally allowable forms of 
relief, where such entities violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights 
 65. 436 U.S. 658 (1977).  In Monell, female employees of the Department of Social Ser-
vices and the New York City Board of Education complained that those agencies “had as a 
matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence 
before such leaves were required for medical reasons.”  Id. at 660–61.  
 66. Id. at 665–89.   
 67. Id. at 665.  
 68. Id. at 701. 
 69. Id. at 665–66. 
 70. Section 7 merely explained that the law would not “supersede or repeal” any laws 
already in existence, except laws that were contrary to the goals of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871.  Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 15 (1871). 
 71. Monell, 436 U.S. at 666. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 681–82. 
 74. Id. at 690. 
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while executing or implementing “a policy statement, ordinance, reg-
ulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s 
officers.”75
The Court’s stipulation that liability would only attach to muni-
cipalities when official policy was the cause of the constitutional harm 
did not apply to formalized official policy alone.
 
76  The Court recog-
nized a key reality—that “persistent and widespread discriminatory 
practices of state officials . . . could well be so permanent and well set-
tled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”77  Be-
cause of this reality, even though a municipality did not formally ap-
prove a particular custom through “official decisionmaking 
channels,”78 a municipality would still be liable under Section 1983 
for a constitutional violation if that unofficial custom were responsible 
for the violation.79
C.  The Court Has Continually Balanced Theories That Would Not Give 
Rise to Section 1983 Liability Against Theories Under Which 
Plaintiffs Could Hold Municipalities Liable   
  
After exposing municipalities to potential Section 1983 liability,80 
the Court established in Monell that plaintiffs could not subject muni-
cipalities to respondeat superior liability under Section 1983.81  Looking 
at the plain language originally passed in Section 1 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871,82 the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to 
hold municipalities liable for merely employing a tortfeasor.83  The 
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 imposed liability on munici-
palities where that municipality’s official policy caused the “employee 
to violate another’s constitutional rights.”84  The Court determined 
that because Congress provided a causation element in Section 1983, 
it “did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was 
absent.”85
 
 75. Id. 
 
 76. Id. at 690–91. 
 77. Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)).  
 78. Id., 436 U.S. at 691. 
 79. Id. at 690–91. 
 80. Id. at 664–89. 
 81. Id. at 691. 
 82. See supra note 54. 
 83. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 
 84. Id. at 692. 
 85. Id. 
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1.  The Court Sought to Draw a Clear Line Between the Actions of 
Municipal Employees and of Municipalities in Determining When 
Section 1983 Liability Would Attach 
After establishing in Monell that official municipal policy had to 
cause the constitutional violation in question,86 the Court in Pembaur 
v. City of Cincinnati addressed what types of decisions, made by which 
class of municipal personnel, would subject municipalities to Sec-
tion 1983 liability.87  In Pembaur, a licensed physician sued the City of 
Cincinnati pursuant to Section 1983 for violating the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.88  The Court determined that where a 
prosecutor advised police officers that they could forcibly enter Pem-
baur’s office, the prosecutor acted as the municipality’s “final deci-
sionmaker,” and the advice, which constituted official municipal poli-
cy, caused police to violate Pembaur’s Fourth Amendment rights.89  
The Court held that Section 1983 municipal liability would attach on-
ly where “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action [was] made 
from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible 
for establishing final policy.”90  The Court was careful to note, howev-
er, that the mere incidence of a policymaking official acting within his 
or her discretion was not enough to establish Section 1983 liability.91  
The key inquiry would be whether that policymaking official was re-
sponsible for establishing final government policy regarding the 
course of action in question.92
 
 86. Id. 
   
 87. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 471 (1986) (“The question pre-
sented is whether, and in what circumstances, a decision by municipal policymakers on a 
single occasion may satisfy [Monell].”).   
 88. Id. at 471, 474.  A grand jury charged Pembaur with fraudulently accepting state 
welfare payments and issued subpoenas for two of Pembaur’s employees to appear in 
court.  Id. at 471–72.  The employees did not appear, and the trial court issued capiases, 
the Ohio equivalent of an arrest warrant.  See id. at 472 & n.1 (noting that a capias allows a 
county official to arrest and detain a person who has failed to appear in court to testify).  
Officers arrived at Pembaur’s office to serve the capiases, but Pembaur did not let them 
enter.  Id. at 472.  The officers called the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office, which in-
structed the officers that they could “go in and get” the employees.  Id. at 473.  Acting 
upon the County Prosecutors’ advice, the officers forcibly entered Pembaur’s office.  Id.        
 89. Id. at 484–85. 
 90. Id. at 483.  The Court concluded that state law would determine whether an official 
possessed final decisionmaking authority.  Id.  In Pembaur, the Court accepted that a coun-
ty prosecutor had the requisite authority to determine municipal policy based on Ohio 
law.  Id. at 484. 
 91. Id. at 481–82. 
 92. Id. at 483–84. 
  
102 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [Vol. 71:92 
Taking its holding in Pembaur further, the Court in Bryan County 
v. Brown93 decided that a municipality could not be liable under Sec-
tion 1983 for allegedly failing to adequately screen an employee’s 
background before hiring him.94  The Court reiterated its holding in 
Monell that a plaintiff seeking to hold a municipality liable must estab-
lish that a municipal policy or custom caused the alleged constitu-
tional violation.95  The Court refined its Section 1983 jurisprudence 
by mandating that a plaintiff must prove that “the municipal action 
was taken with the requisite degree of culpability” and that such ac-
tion directly caused the constitutional violation.96  The Court recog-
nized, however, that where a plaintiff alleged that a municipal action 
directly violated or caused an employee to violate constitutional 
rights, the culpability and causation requirements were usually met.97
In Bryan County, however, the Court did not address a municipal-
ity’s policy or custom.
   
98  Instead, the Court addressed whether a mu-
nicipality could be liable based entirely on its lawful decision to hire 
an employee who violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights when act-
ing on his own and not under the command of a municipal policy or 
custom.99  The plaintiffs in Bryan County could not establish that the 
municipality was culpable or that the municipality’s actions caused 
the constitutional violation.100
 
 93. 520 U.S. 397 (1997). 
  And, in the Court’s view, a municipali-
ty’s hiring decision might constitute some degree of negligence, but 
 94. Id. at 415–16.  Brown and her husband were driving when they arrived at a police 
checkpoint.  Id. at 400.  The Browns turned away from the checkpoint and Bryan County 
officers Robert Morrison and Stacy Burns pursued the Browns’ vehicle.  Id.  The car chase 
ended four miles from the police checkpoint.  Id.  Subsequently, Officer Morrison pointed 
his gun toward the Browns and ordered them to raise their hands.  Id.  Officer Burns or-
dered Mrs. Brown from the vehicle, and when she refused to exit, “he used an ‘arm bar’ 
technique, grabbing [Mrs. Brown’s] arm at the wrist and elbow, pulling her from the ve-
hicle, and spinning her to the ground.”  Id. at 400–01.  Mrs. Brown had to undergo surgery 
to repair severely injured knees, and doctors advised her that she might need knee re-
placement surgery.  Id. at 401.   
The Browns sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the municipality failed to ade-
quately screen Officer Burns’ background.  Id.  Specifically, “Burns had a record of driving 
infractions and had pleaded guilty to various driving-related and other misdemeanors, in-
cluding assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness.”  Id.  At the time, Ok-
lahoma law did not preclude the hiring of a police officer who had previously committed a 
misdemeanor.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 403. 
 96. Id. at 404. 
 97. See id. at 404–05 (noting that when the claim is that a municipal action directly vi-
olates federal law “resolving the[] issues of fault and causation is straightforward”). 
 98. Id. at 404–07. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 415–16. 
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not the culpability required to show the deliberate indifference that a 
municipality’s failure to train might show.101
2.   The Court Expanded Section 1983 Liability to Constitutional 
Violations Stemming from a Municipality’s Failure to Train Its 
Employees  
 
Having addressed the types of decisions that would give rise to 
Section 1983 liability,102 the Court in City of Canton v. Harris103 tackled 
the novel theory of attaching Section 1983 liability to municipalities 
where the municipality allegedly failed to train its employees.104  In 
Canton, police officers arrested Harris, who showed signs that she was 
suffering from a medical condition.105  The officers never obtained 
any medical attention for Harris while she was detained, and an hour 
after Harris was released from police custody, her family summoned 
an ambulance.106  Doctors diagnosed Harris with several “emotional 
ailments” and hospitalized her for a week.107  Harris then sued the 
City of Canton pursuant to Section 1983, alleging that it violated her 
“right . . . to receive necessary medical attention while in police cus-
tody.”108  While the Court did not decide whether Harris could hold 
Canton liable, it mandated that the deliberate indifference standard 
would apply to failure-to-train cases,109 and remanded the case to the 
Sixth Circuit to decide whether Canton was liable using the deliberate 
indifference test.110  The Court held that Section 1983 liability for the 
failure to train would attach to a municipality where “the failure to 
train amount[ed] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 
with whom the [municipal employee came] into contact.”111
 
 101. Id. at 407, 409. 
  As with 
prior decisions regarding Section 1983 municipal liability, the Court 
sought to narrowly define the circumstances under which municipali-
 102. See generally Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 471 (1986) (addressing 
the question “whether, and in what circumstances, a decision by municipal policymakers 
on a single occasion may satisfy” the requirements of Monell). 
 103. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
 104. Id. at 380. 
 105. Id. at 381. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 388. 
 110. Id. at 392. 
 111. Id. at 388. 
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ties would be liable for failure to train.112  The Court stressed that only 
where a plaintiff could establish deliberate indifference could a mu-
nicipality’s failure to train amount to a municipal policy.113
This requirement reflected the Court’s opinion that in certain 
circumstances, “the need for ‘more or different training’ [might] be 
so obvious,” and the lack of such training “so likely” to cause constitu-
tional violations, that the municipal decision maker “can reasonably 
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need [for more or 
different training].”
 
114  It is here that the Court provided its famous 
hypothetical scenario in which Section 1983 liability would attach to 
municipalities for a single constitutional violation.115  Central to the 
Court’s vision of single-incident liability was the notion that by failing 
to train, where training was obviously necessary, a municipality could 
be said to have given tacit approval to constitutional violations.116  In 
essence, the Court equated the decision not to train, or to provide in-
sufficient training, with an official municipal policy that could cause 
constitutional harm.117
Still, the Court cautioned that proving a particular municipal 
employee was insufficiently trained would not necessarily give way to 
liability.
   
118  The insufficient training would have to actually cause the 
municipal employee to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.119
 
 112. See id. at 380 (holding that “under certain circumstances, [Section 1983 failure to 
train] liability is permitted by the statute.”).   
  
The Court conceded that making this determination involved difficult 
 113. Id. at 389. 
 114. Id. at 390.  
 115. The hypothetical situation in which single-incident liability would attach to a mu-
nicipality reads as follows: 
For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police offic-
ers will be required to arrest fleeing felons.  The city has armed its officers with 
firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task.  Thus, the need to train 
officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to 
be “so obvious,” that failure to do so could properly be characterized as “delibe-
rate indifference” to constitutional rights. 
Id. at 390 n.10 (citation omitted). 
 116. See id. at 390 (stating that, where a lack of training will likely lead to constitutional 
violations, “the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy 
for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually 
causes injury”). 
 117. Id.  The Court advised lower courts to focus on the “adequacy of the training pro-
gram in relation to the tasks the particular [municipal employee] must perform.”  Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 391. 
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hypothetical calculations.120  Importantly, however, the Court realized 
that determining whether a particular training regimen—or lack the-
reof—caused an actor to violate a plaintiff’s rights, like any other fac-
tual consideration, should be handled by the fact finder.121
Concurring in part and dissenting in part with the majority opi-
nion in Canton, Justice O’Connor stressed that failure-to-train liability 
might be “proper where [a municipality was] aware of . . . a pattern of 
constitutional violations involving the exercise of [a municipal em-
ployee’s] discretion.”
 
122  Justice O’Connor looked to lower courts ap-
plying the deliberate indifference standard and noted that those 
courts required at least a pattern of similar incidents sufficient 
enough to place a municipal policymaker “on notice” of constitution-
al abuses.123  Absent from Justice O’Connor’s discussion of the re-
quirement of a pattern of constitutional abuses is any notion that the 
nature of the prior constitutional abuses be exactly the same.124  In-
stead, Justice O’Connor cited lower court opinions that required a 
showing of a pattern of widespread, similar constitutional viola-
tions.125
Similarly, in dicta in Bryan County the Court suggested that in the 
context of a failure-to-train theory a “pattern of injuries [was] ordina-
rily necessary to establish municipal culpability and causation.”
 
126  The 
Court, however, reiterated the Canton application of single-incident 
liability by emphasizing that a showing that the constitutional injury at 
issue was the “highly predictable consequence” of a failure to train 
could be substituted for demonstrating a pattern of injuries.127
 
 120. Id.  The Court stressed that “matters of judgment” would be involved in determin-
ing how a “hypothetically well-trained” municipal employee would react in a circumstance 
that might implicate constitutional rights.  Id.  The Court acknowledged that even an ade-
quately trained employee might violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but ultimately, 
the Court stressed that the fact finder would be best suited to determine whether the suffi-
ciency of a training regimen was the cause of any constitutional violation.  Id. 
  Under 
this single-incident liability formulation, deliberate indifference could 
be established based on the “likelihood” that a constitutional injury 
would repeat and the “predictability” that a municipal employee lack-
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. (making no mention of any requirement that the constitutional violations 
alleged in a pattern be exactly alike, though indicating that similarity of incidents is neces-
sary). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). 
 127. Id. at 409–10. 
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ing sufficient training would violate a citizen’s constitutional rights.128  
In discussing the requisite showing to establish a pattern, the Court 
never scrutinized the types of evidence at issue in each prior constitu-
tional injury.129
D.  Even in Light of a Clear Brady Test, the Court Has Struggled to 
Reach Consensus and Has Acknowledged Difficulty Applying Brady 
to Subsequent Cases 
    
While the Connick Court’s primary objective was to address mu-
nicipal liability under the failure-to-train theory, the Court also strug-
gled with its own understanding of the prosecutorial obligations es-
tablished in Brady.   
In Brady, the Court dealt with a prosecutor’s suppression of an 
extrajudicial confession in a murder trial.130  The Court held that 
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material ei-
ther to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution.”131  The Court did not make any determina-
tion regarding the actual nature of the evidence in question.  Rather, 
the Court was concerned with the evidence’s effect on the criminal 
defendant’s “guilt or . . . punishment.”132
In United States v. Agurs,
  
133
 
 128. Id. at 409. 
 the Court did away with the request 
requirement of Brady when it determined that, in some cases, a feder-
 129. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stipulating that municipal discretion should be a feature of each incident in a pat-
tern of constitutional violations rather than the requirement that similar types of evidence 
be at issue in a municipality’s pattern of constitutional violations).  
 130. 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).  Brady and his friend Boblit were convicted of first-degree 
murder and were sentenced to death.  Id.  While Brady confessed to participating in the 
crime, he maintained that Boblit was the killer.  Id.  Brady’s counsel requested Boblit’s 
extrajudicial statements, but the prosecution refused.  In one of the withheld extrajudicial 
statements, Boblit admitted that he was the killer.  Id.  The Court held that the prosecu-
tor’s suppression of the statements violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 86. 
 131. Id. at 87. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).  Linda Agurs was convicted of stabbing Sewell to death.  Id. at 
98.  At trial, Agurs’s only defense was that Sewell attacked her with a knife first, and that 
she acted in self-defense when she stabbed Sewell.  Id. at 100.  After Augurs was convicted, 
the defense discovered that the prosecution had failed to disclose “that Sewell had a prior 
criminal record that would have further evidenced his violent character.”  Id.  Sewell had 
previously pled guilty to two separate charges of carrying a deadly weapon and one charge 
of assault.  Id. at 100–01.  Knives were the weapons at issue in each of the deadly weapons 
charges.  Id. at 101. 
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al prosecutor had a constitutional duty to disclose evidence that was 
favorable to the accused, even in the absence of a specific request for 
Brady material.134  The Court recognized that there was no “unlimited 
discovery” requirement for prosecutors,135 but the Court was ultimate-
ly concerned with the prospect of prosecutors possessing exculpatory 
evidence of which defendants were not aware.136  In light of this pos-
sibility, the Court determined that, where the evidence at issue was “so 
clearly” exculpatory that it put the prosecution on “notice of a duty” 
to disclose, the prosecution should disclose regardless of the criminal 
defendant’s request or lack thereof.137  Still, the Court established that 
the evidence at issue had to meet a standard of materiality that if the 
withheld evidence created a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s 
guilt, then a Brady violation existed.138  Ultimately, a prosecutor would 
violate Brady where his or her withholding of evidence denied a de-
fendant’s right to a fair trial.139  Almost immediately after establishing 
this standard, however, the Court recognized that it was “inevitably 
imprecise.”140
In Strickler v. Greene,
 
141 the Court refined its Brady jurisprudence 
and set forth a three-factor test for analyzing whether a Brady violation 
existed.  The Court analyzed Brady requirements in the context of 
contradicting testimonial evidence,142 and again, the Court focused 
on the effect of the evidence as opposed to the nature of the evi-
dence.143
 
 134. Id. at 107–08. 
  The Court set forth the following test: “[1] [t]he evidence 
at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpa-
tory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] pre-
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 106–07. 
 137. Id. at 107. 
 138. Id. at 112. 
 139. Id. at 108. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).  Tommy Strickler was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death after abducting, robbing, and killing Leanne Whitlock.  Id. at 266.  At trial, a witness 
named Anne Stoltzfus gave detailed testimony about Whitlock’s abduction.  Id.  After trial, 
Strickler alleged that the prosecution failed to produce evidence consisting of “documents 
prepared by Stoltzfus, and notes of interviews with her, that impeach[ed] significant por-
tions of her testimony.”  Id.  The Court noted that even absent Stoltzfus’s testimony, the 
evidence sufficiently supported Strickler’s guilt.  Id.  
 142. See id. at 282 (observing that conflicting testimony established at least two of the 
three Brady factors). 
 143. See id. at 281–82 (setting out the Brady test, which is not concerned with the type of 
the evidence in question, but rather the effect of the evidence). 
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judice must have ensued.”144  Even with this three-part test in place, 
the Strickler Court could not reach unanimity as to whether a Brady vi-
olation existed in that case.145  Highlighting the distinction between 
the Court’s reasoning and his own, Justice Souter wrote: “In the end, 
however, the Court finds the undisclosed evidence inadequate to un-
dermine confidence in the jury’s sentencing recommendation, whe-
reas I find it sufficient to do that.”146
Given that both Section 1983 municipal liability and Brady are 
relatively young in the canon of Supreme Court decisions, the Court 
has left much to be resolved.  The Court has not achieved a compre-
hensive cure-all to settle impending theories of Section 1983 liabili-
ty,
  
147 and the Justices remain divided on where prosecutorial eviden-
tiary obligations lie in the wake of Brady.148
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
    
In Connick v.Thompson, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit and held that a District Attorney’s office could not be 
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train based on a sin-
gle Brady violation.149
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, determined that 
Thompson did not prove that District Attorney Connick had actual or 
constructive notice of the need for Brady training.
 
150  Consequently, 
Thompson did not prove that Connick was deliberately indifferent to 
such a need for more or different Brady training.151
First, the Court affirmed that, as established by Monell, under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 a local government could be held liable if the govern-
   
 
 144. Id. 
 145.  Compare id. at 296 (rejecting a showing of “reasonable probability” that disclosure 
would have altered conviction or sentence), with id. at 297 (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (finding “reasonable probability” that disclosure could have altered 
the sentence).  Although he agreed with the majority that the withheld Stolzfus evidence 
was not material to Strickler’s guilt, Justice Souter believed that Strickler met the burden 
of establishing that there was a “reasonable probability that [the evidence] would have led 
the jury to recommend” a life sentence to the judge as opposed to a death sentence.  Id. at 
297.  
 146. Id. at 301–02 (reflecting further that these “differing conclusions largely reflect dif-
ferent assessments of the significance of jurors probably ascribed to the Stoltzfus testimo-
ny”). 
 147. See supra Part II.A–C.  
 148. See supra Part II.D. 
 149. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1366 (2011).  
 150. Id. at 1360. 
 151. Id. 
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ment body deprived a person of rights or caused a person’s depriva-
tion of rights.152  The Court noted, however, that pursuant to Pembaur, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on local governments “only for their 
own . . . acts,” and does not hold governments “vicariously liable . . . 
for their employees’ actions.”153  For a plaintiff “to impose liability on 
local governments under Section 1983,” the plaintiff would have to 
prove that the local government’s official policy caused his or her in-
jury.154  A local government’s failure to train employees on their legal 
obligations to avoid violating a citizen’s constitutional rights would be 
equivalent to an official government policy for Section 1983 purposes 
only in very limited circumstances.155  The Court quoted Canton v. 
Harris to establish that under Section 1983 “a municipality’s failure to 
train its employees . . . must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the 
rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into 
contact.’”156  A municipality could be liable under Section 1983 only if 
a plaintiff could prove this deliberate indifference.157  The Court ac-
knowledged that a pattern of Brady violations was necessary in most 
cases to demonstrate such deliberate indifference, and that absent 
any notice that a particular type of training was inadequate, a plaintiff 
could not establish that a local government was deliberately indiffe-
rent to the need for better training.158
Thompson argued that in the ten years before his armed robbery 
trial, Louisiana courts “overturned four convictions because of Brady 
violations” committed by Connick’s assistant district attorneys.
   
159  The 
Court found, however, that Thompson did not prove a pattern of 
Brady violations by the prosecutors in Connick’s office.160
 
 152. Id. at 1359. 
  The Court 
 153. Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted). 
 154. Id.  “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, 
the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to prac-
tically have the force of law.”  Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).  See also Bryan County v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1996) (“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of 
fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence 
of his action.”). 
 157. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 158. See id.  (“Policymakers’ continued adherence to an approach that they know or 
should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the con-
scious disregard for the consequences of their action—the deliberate indifference—
necessary to trigger municipal liability.”(quoting Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 407) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 159. Id.    
 160. Id.   
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rejected Thompson’s argument that the prior violations put Connick 
on notice for a need for better Brady training because “[n]one of 
those [four] cases involved failure to disclose” the type of evidence at 
issue in Thompson’s case.161  Justice Thomas reasoned that the prior 
Brady violations would have to be “similar to the violation at issue [in 
Thompson’s case to] put Connick on notice that specific [Brady] 
training” was needed to avoid violating a person’s constitutional 
rights.162
Next, the Court rejected Thompson’s single-incident liability ar-
gument, which the Court in Canton acknowledged only when the 
need for training was so obvious that it reflected deliberate indiffe-
rence.
 
163  In Canton, the Court gave the hypothetical example of a city 
sending armed police officers, who were untrained about the consti-
tutional limits of their power, into the public to capture felons.164  
The Canton Court determined that given the obviously high probabili-
ty of a police force’s “attempt to arrest . . . felons and the predictabili-
ty that an officer [without specific training would] violate a citizen[‘s] 
rights, . . . a city’s decision not to train [police] officers about [the] 
constitutional limits” of their power could establish that the city was 
deliberately indifferent to the “highly predictable consequence” of 
police officers violating citizens’ rights.165  With the Canton hypotheti-
cal in mind, Justice Thomas acknowledged that local governments 
could be liable under Section 1983 without proof of a pattern of viola-
tions in such rare circumstances in which a government’s failure to 
train its employees would obviously lead to violations of citizens’ con-
stitutional rights, as in the deadly force example given in Canton.166  
The Connick Court was not convinced, however, that the failure to 
train prosecutors about Brady violations fell within that limited cir-
cumstance in which a lack of training would obviously lead to consti-
tutional violations.167
 
 161. Id.  (observing that none of the prior cases “involved failure to disclose blood evi-
dence, a crime lab report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind”). 
   
 162. Id.  Justice Thomas cites no authority that requires or gives any indication that the 
evidence in the pattern of constitutional violations must be similar to the evidence in the 
alleged constitutional violation at issue to put the municipality on notice that more train-
ing is necessary.  See id.   
 163. Id. at 1361.   
 164. See supra note 115. 
 165. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361 (quoting Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the reasoning in Canton)). 
 166. See id. (recognizing the validity of the deadly force example as creating “circums-
tances [where] there is an obvious need for some form of training”). 
 167. Id. 
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The Court reasoned that there was no “obvious need for specific 
legal training” because, unlike an armed police officer who was unfa-
miliar with constitutional limitations, a lawyer was already “trained in 
the law and equipped with the tools to interpret and apply legal prin-
cipals, understand constitutional limits, and exercise legal judg-
ment.”168  To illustrate that a prosecutor’s office could not be liable 
for a single Brady violation for failure to train, the Court declared that 
even novice lawyers were already well trained to understand Brady vi-
olations.169  The Court reasoned that a law school education, com-
bined with the requirement that lawyers pass the bar exam and satisfy 
continuing legal education requirements, was enough training to en-
sure that lawyers were competent to find, understand, and apply legal 
rules.170  The Court concluded that in the absence of a pattern of Bra-
dy violations, a District Attorney could rely on his or her prosecutors’ 
professional training as sufficient for those prosecutors to understand 
Brady’s requirements.171  Further, the Court reasoned that Thomp-
son’s showing that the Brady obligations might be unclear was, by it-
self, insufficient to show that a District Attorney’s failure to train 
proved deliberate indifference.172  Thompson was required to estab-
lish that Connick had notice that, absent training on Brady violations, 
it was obvious that prosecutors would violate Brady’s requirements.173
The Court acknowledged that prosecutors would not always 
make the right decision with regard to avoiding Brady violations, but 
the Court would not allow government liability based on Thompson’s 
argument that additional Brady training might have helped prosecu-
tors make “difficult decisions.”
 
174  In its final assessment, the Court 
acknowledged that Connick’s prosecutors failed to carry out their eth-
ical responsibilities, but reiterated that those ethical failures were not 
at issue in Thompson’s case.175
 
 168. Id. 
  The only question before the Court 
 169. Id. at 1361–62 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 664 (1984)). 
 170. Id. at 1361. 
 171. Id. at 1363. 
 172. Id. at 1363–64. 
 173. Id. at 1365.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in 
its entirety, but wrote separately only to rebut the dissent.  Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).  Justice Scalia criticized the dissent for what he called an “excavation of the trial 
record” and proposed that in the present case “[t]here was probably no Brady violation at 
all . . . .”  Id. at 1366, 1369.  Justice Scalia reasoned that there was no Supreme Court 
precedent for requiring prosecutors to produce “untested” evidence under Brady, and that 
Connick could not have been put on notice to train his prosecutors on a requirement that 
had never been recognized by the Court.  Id. at 1369. 
 174. Id. at 1363–64 (majority opinion). 
 175. Id. at 1365–66. 
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was “whether Connick, as the policymaker for the district attorney’s 
office, was deliberately indifferent to the need to train the attorneys 
under his authority.”176  The Court ultimately decided that Connick 
was not.177
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would 
have affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit awarding Thompson 
damages.
 
178  Justice Ginsburg concluded that the prosecutors’ con-
cealment of exculpatory evidence for nearly two decades indicated 
that members of Connick’s office disregarded certain Brady require-
ments.179  Next, Justice Ginsburg detailed the Brady violations that the 
prosecutors perpetrated, in the context of the case’s procedural histo-
ry.180  Finally, Justice Ginsburg rejected the majority opinion’s argu-
ment that the failure to train on the obligations of Brady would not 
obviously lead to violations of Brady’s constitutional requirements.181  
Justice Ginsburg argued that Connick’s novice prosecutors were not 
as well-prepared to understand Brady as the majority assumed, noting 
that even Connick conceded “that his prosecutors, because of their 
inexperience, were not so equipped.”182  Further, given the difficulty 
any attorney would encounter when meeting Brady’s requirements, 
Justice Ginsburg stressed the importance of adequate training.183
 
 176. Id. at 1366. 
  Jus-
tice Ginsburg also rejected the majority’s determination that a pattern 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 1370. 
 180. Id. at 1371–76.  Before Thompson’s armed robbery trial, he filed a motion request-
ing “access to all materials and information” favorable to him, evidence “relevant to [his] 
guilt or punishment, as well as . . . results or reports” regarding scientific tests.  Id. at 1372.  
Connick’s prosecutors did not allow Thompson to inspect the robber’s blood.  Id.  Con-
nick’s prosecutors officially granted Thompson permission to inspect the blood evidence, 
but someone signed the evidence out from the property room and did not return it until 
the day before Thompson’s trial.  Id. at 1372–73.  Prosecutors did not inform Thompson 
about the blood evidence’s location “and its . . . removal from the property room.”  Id. at 
1373.  The report on the blood evidence clearly identified the robber’s blood type, and 
Connick’s prosecutors never provided the report to Thompson.  Id.  Prosecutors also 
withheld police reports that detailed statements by the eyewitness to the murder.  Id. at 
1371.  These reports established that eyewitnesses had described a suspect whose physical 
description did not match Thompson.  Id.  Further, Deegan, a prosecutor in Thompson’s 
armed robbery trial, admitted that he had purposely suppressed blood evidence that 
would have exculpated Thompson.  Id. at 1374.   
 181. See id. at 1382–87 (applying the Canton deliberate indifference standard to the 
conduct of District Attorney Connick’s prosecutors and concluding that single-incident 
liability would have been appropriate). 
 182. Id. at 1386. 
 183. Id. 
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of Brady violations was necessary to show deliberate indifference given 
that the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not contain such a limitation.184
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
In Connick v. Thompson, the Supreme Court excised prosecutors’ 
Brady violations from the limited class of circumstances that would 
merit single-incident liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.185  In rejecting 
the dissent’s correct assertion that prosecutorial misconduct should 
fall within this class, which was first illustrated by the contentiously 
debated Canton hypothetical, the majority made one of the Supreme 
Court’s most puzzling arguments regarding the sufficiency of the le-
gal training one receives in law school,186 virtually immunizing prose-
cutors from Section 1983 liability for Brady violations.187  In its next 
misstep, the Court left only confusion for lower courts to fill a gaping 
chasm in Section 1983 jurisprudence by deciding that a plaintiff could 
not establish a pattern of Brady violations where the evidence in the 
previous violations was “not similar” to the evidence at issue, without 
discussing the requisite level of similarity.188  Lastly, without any dis-
cussion of the trial court’s instruction on the deliberate indifference 
test, the Court incorrectly set aside a jury’s determination that Harry 
Connick Sr., the Louisiana District Attorney, was deliberately indiffe-
rent to the need to train his prosecutors on Brady violations.189
A.  The Court Erred in Holding That a Municipality’s Failure to Train 
Prosecutors on Brady Violations Was Not an Obvious Circumstance 
That Was Likely to Deprive Defendants of Their Constitutional Rights 
   
The Court first signaled what single-incident liability might look 
like in its Canton hypothetical.190
 
 184. Id. 
  This single-incident liability theory 
was premised on the reality that a “need for more or different train-
ing [might be] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in 
the violation of constitutional rights” that a municipality could exhibit 
 185. Id. at 1366 (majority opinion). 
 186. Cf. Note, Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 331, 331 (2011) (“[T]he Court found 
that general lawyerly skills justify a presumption that prosecutors are adequately trained to 
secure Brady rights, its support for this proposition is deficient, and its reading of doctrine 
is unduly narrow.”). 
 187. See infra Part IV.A. 
 188. See infra Part IV.B. 
 189. See infra Part IV.C. 
 190. See supra note 115. 
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deliberate indifference by choosing not to train.191  In Connick, a jury 
approved Thompson’s argument that Connick was deliberately indif-
ferent in failing to train his prosecutors on Brady obligations.192  In 
light of evidence suggesting the pervasive disregard and misunders-
tanding of Brady in the District Attorney’s office,193 and the disagree-
ments on the scope of Brady even among Justices of the Supreme 
Court,194 the Court should have included prosecutorial misconduct 
within the ambit of single-incident Section 1983 liability.  This out-
come is especially warranted given that Brady violations are “pervasive 
and recurring,”195 and courts often apply Brady inconsistently,196 creat-
ing distrust in a prosecutor’s ability to seek justice.197
 
 191. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 
   
 192. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 193. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (noting that “during the 
ten years preceding [Thompson’s] armed robbery trial, Louisiana courts had overturned 
four convictions because of Brady violations by prosecutors in Connick’s office”).  See also 
id. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven at trial Connick persisted in misstating Bra-
dy’s requirements.”); id. at 1379 (“[Assistant District Attorneys] Dubelier and Williams 
learned the prosecutorial craft in Connick’s Office, and . . . their testimony manifested a 
woefully deficient understanding of Brady.”); id. at 1380 (“[A] survey of assistant district 
attorneys in the [Louisiana District Attorney’s] Office revealed that more than half felt 
that they had not received the training they needed to do their jobs.”). 
 194. Compare id. at 1358 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that a Brady violation took 
place) with id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring) (declaring that “[t]here was probably no 
Brady violation at all”) and id. at 1370–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the pros-
ecutors egregiously violated Brady).  See also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) 
(holding that the plaintiff did not prove a Brady violation because he did not establish that 
there was a sufficient likelihood that his conviction or sentence would have been different 
had the evidence in question been disclosed); id. at 301–02 (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (concluding based on the same facts that a Brady violation did ex-
ist).  
 195. See Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 
687 (2006) (noting that “despite reversals, guidelines, ethical oversight, and hortatory ap-
peals to prosecutors to seek justice, Brady’s promise of transforming criminal trials from a 
‘sporting’ theory of litigation into a genuine search for the truth has largely been unkept.  
Indeed, by exposing the seamy, secretive, and cavalier disregard by prosecutors of the 
rights of criminal defendants, Brady has engendered widespread cynicism about the capac-
ity of prosecutors to comply with their constitutional and ethical obligations, as well as the 
willingness of courts and disciplinary agencies to hold prosecutors accountable for their 
derelictions.”). 
 196. Id. at 689 (arguing that “[e]ven in those infrequent instances when a prosecutor’s 
suppression of evidence is discovered, the judiciary’s enforcement of Brady has been in-
consistent, confusing, and increasingly deferential to the prosecutor’s discretion”). 
 197. Cf. Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of 
Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 421, 442 (noting that prosecutors have little 
incentive to comply with Brady because of little oversight and almost no retribution for vi-
olations, and that Brady violations can contribute to “the erosion of public confidence in 
the ability of the judicial system to convict only the guilty and free the innocent”). 
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If “tort remedies offer what is perhaps the best hope of achieving 
increased control over police illegality,”198 the same should be true of 
illegality within any municipal organization that regularly affects the 
constitutional rights of citizens, especially a District Attorney’s of-
fice.199  To counter this argument, Justice Thomas strayed far from 
the facts in Thompson’s case and crafted an argument that could only 
hold water if students learned and practiced the law in a vacuum.  Jus-
tice Thomas’s view of prosecutorial misconduct was that district attor-
neys could not be responsible for the training of even the most novice 
attorney.200  In Justice Thomas’s opinion, prosecutorial misconduct 
could not conceptually stem from a prosecutor’s lack of training, be-
cause, among other factors, all attorneys graduate from law school 
with sufficient training to handle any complex set of legal concepts, 
such as Brady.201  Justice Thomas’s contention does not account for 
the fact that even the most well-trained attorneys arrive at different, 
and often, contradictory understandings of the same legal concept.202  
Connick conceded that his prosecutors were burdened by large case 
loads.203  This fact puts into doubt Justice Thomas’s portrayal of no-
vice lawyers “exercise[ing] legal judgment,”204
 
 198. Foote, supra note 
 free from the real-
64, at 516.  
 199. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1385 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] municipality that empowers prosecutors to press for a death sentence without ensur-
ing that those prosecutors know and honor Brady rights may be no less ‘deliberately indif-
ferent’ to the risk of innocent lives.”); Jones, supra note 197, at 421 (“[T]he criminal jus-
tice system has not developed effective reforms to provide a remedy for defendants or 
appropriately sanction prosecutors for concealing evidence favorable to the defense.”). 
 200. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363 (observing that “[i]n light of [the existing] regime of 
legal training and professional responsibility, recurring constitutional violations are not 
the ‘obvious consequence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training 
about how to obey the law”) (citing Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 490 (1997)). 
 201. Id. at 1361–62 (2011).   
 202. See supra note 194.  Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Connick, relied heav-
ily on Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), in determining that there was probably 
no Brady violation in Thompson’s case.  Id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Youngblood, 
however, did not deal with a straightforward Brady violation.  It dealt with a police force’s 
failure to preserve semen samples that may have been “useful” to the defendant.  See 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 55, 58 (observing that “[t]here is no question but that the State 
complied with Brady . . . here”).  By contrast, Brady does not address usefulness, but rather 
whether evidence is exculpatory.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963).  In 
Thompson’s case, the evidence at issue was clearly exculpatory.  
 203. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 204. See id. at 1361–63 (majority opinion) (portraying novice attorneys as possessing suf-
ficient legal training to handle complex legal issues, while neglecting to address the work 
pressures and lack of understanding that were prevalent in Connick’s office). See also Lead-
ing Cases, supra note 186, at 337 (highlighting that Justice Thomas’s opinion in Connick was 
“flawed” because “it depends on the factual premise that legal training is sufficient to justi-
fy a presumption of adequacy for all prosecutors”). 
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world pressures that Justice Ginsburg acknowledged.205  Further, Jus-
tice Thomas’s reflections on the training power of continuing legal 
education206 is less persuasive given the reality that “Louisiana did not 
require continuing legal education at the time of Thompson’s tri-
als.”207  Justice Thomas posits yet another argument for the infallibility 
of legal training: attorneys often get on-the-job training.208  While 
Connick’s office did have such training in place (a conference in 
which prosecutors would pre-try cases with a superior), Dubelier and 
Williams, the prosecutors in Thompson’s trial, did not take part in 
this program before Thompson’s case.209
When one sets aside Justice Thomas’s argument and plugs the 
facts of Connick into the single-incident inquiry established in Canton, 
it becomes clear how dangerous an untrained prosecutor can be 
when wielding unchecked power to violate constitutional rights.  The 
Canton single-incident liability inquiry requires that “the need for 
more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely 
to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers 
of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent 
to the need.”
 
210  This inherently requires that courts engage in a fac-
tual analysis.211  In her dissent in Connick, Justice Ginsburg hig-
hlighted the vital facts necessary for such an inquiry.  First, Connick 
acknowledged that his understanding of Brady was flawed.212  Second, 
“[t]he testimony of other leaders in the District Attorney’s Office re-
vealed similar misunderstandings.”213
 
 205. Id. at 1378, 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (highlighting the day-to-day pressures 
that prosecutors often work under, and the actual pressures that prosecutors in District 
Attorney Connick’s office faced, such as large case loads and pressure to gain convictions). 
  Lastly, Connick did not have an 
 206. Id. at 1362 (majority opinion). 
 207. Id. at 1381 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 208. Id. at 1362 (majority opinion). 
 209. Id. at 1380 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 210. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 
 211. See id. at 390 (“[T]he focus must be on adequacy of the training program in rela-
tion to the tasks the particular officers must perform.”). 
 212. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Connick admitted to the jury 
that his earlier understanding of Brady, conveyed in prior sworn testimony, had been too 
narrow.”); id. (“Connick urged that there could be no Brady violation arising out of ‘the 
inadvertent conduct of [an] assistant under pressure with a lot of case load.’”).  The trial 
court corrected Connick’s belief for the jury when it instructed: “in determining whether 
there has been a Brady violation, the ‘good or bad faith of the prosecution does not mat-
ter.’”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 213. Id. at 1378–79 (providing numerous examples of Brady misunderstandings within 
the Louisiana District Attorney’s office). 
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adequate system in place to ensure prosecutors understood Brady.214  
An expert witness described Connick’s oversight of Brady competence 
as “the blind leading the blind.”215  Justice Thomas’s conclusory re-
sponse to these facts is puzzling: “it is undisputed here that the prose-
cutors in Connick’s office were familiar with the general Brady 
rule.”216
The facts of Connick illustrate the fallacy of Justice Thomas’s con-
tention that all prosecutors graduate “equipped . . . to know what Bra-
dy entails.”
   
217  He admonished the dissent for not understanding the 
subtle nuances of Canton, stating, “The Canton hypothetical assumes 
that the armed police officers have no knowledge at all of the consti-
tutional limits on the use of deadly force.”218  This assumption may be 
true, but the Canton hypothetical might also suggest that police offic-
ers, like any other municipal employees tasked with making life-and-
death constitutional decisions, need continual monitoring and as-
sessment of their understanding of constitutional obligations.  Under 
this formulation—the same formulation under which a jury found 
Connick deliberately indifferent—an untrained prosecutor and an 
untrained police officer have the same potential to violate a citizen’s 
constitutional rights.219  Seeking to distinguish police officers from 
prosecutors, Justice Thomas declared, “[a]rmed police must some-
times make split-second decisions with life-or-death consequences.”220  
But, as Justice Ginsburg correctly pointed out, “a municipality that 
empowers prosecutors to press for a death sentence without ensuring 
that those prosecutors know and honor Brady rights may be no less 
‘deliberately indifferent’ to the risk to innocent lives.”221
 
 214. Id. at 1380 (“Prosecutors confirmed that training in the District Attorney’s Office, 
overall, was deficient.”); id. at 1379 (“Connick has effectively conceded that Brady training 
in his Office was inadequate.”) (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 60.); id at 1381 (“Louisiana did not 
require continuing legal education at the time of Thompson’s trials.  Primary responsibili-
ty for keeping prosecutors au courant with developments in the law, therefore, resided in 
the District Attorney’s Office.”) (citations omitted). 
  
 215. Id. at 1380. 
 216. Id. at 1363 (majority opinion).  Indeed, Justice Thomas enlists no support from the 
record to support this declaration.  See id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. at 1385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion). 
 221. Id. at 1385 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  Cf. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., 368 
F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient evidence that a municipality should have 
been on notice of the risk presented by a lack of nurse training to handle mentally ill in-
mates).  The court in Woodward would not give the hospital a “‘one free suicide’ pass” de-
spite the fact that no one had committed suicide in the past.  Id. at 929.  It would seem as 
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In this regard, the Sixth Circuit correctly held in Moldowan v. 
Warren222 that Brady violations were a likely consequence of a lack of 
sufficient training.223  The Moldowan court recognized correctly that 
Section 1983 would be an effective guardian of constitutional rights 
only if courts held municipalities accountable for Brady violations.224  
In addressing the failure-to-train theory, the court highlighted Can-
ton’s fact-intensive analysis, which focused on the sufficiency of the 
training program in place in relation to the task the municipal em-
ployee had to perform.225  The Moldowan court recognized Canton’s 
requirement that, given police officers’ duty under Brady to produce 
evidence favorable to the accused, municipalities also had a “corres-
ponding obligation” to sufficiently train officers on this duty.226
The Sixth Circuit later solidified this approach in Gregory v. 
Louisville,
  The 
municipality in Thompson’s case had a similar duty to sufficiently 
train its prosecutors. 
227 when it determined that “[w]idespread officer ignorance 
on the proper handling of exculpatory materials would have the 
‘highly predictable consequence’ of due process violations.”228  Key to 
the Gregory court’s analysis was the likelihood that ignorance of Brady, 
as shown by a complete absence of training, would likely cause consti-
tutional violations.229  Just as it did in Moldowan, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that this inquiry would necessitate a factual analysis of the 
municipality’s training program.230
 
though had Louisiana executed Thompson, the Court would find no qualms in giving the 
District Attorney a “one free execution pass.” 
 
 222. 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009).  In Moldowan, Jeffrey Moldowan was convicted of 
kidnapping, assault with intent to commit murder, and criminal sexual conduct.  Id. at 
365.  After spending almost twelve years in prison, Moldowan was acquitted of all charges.  
Id. at 366.  Moldowan then sued the City of Warren, among others, after discovering that 
those involved with his prosecution had withheld exculpatory testimonial evidence.  Id. at 
376. 
 223. Id. at 393. 
 224. Id. at 377. 
 225. Id. at 393. 
 226. Id. 
 227. 444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006).  William Gregory sued the City of Louisville and oth-
er municipal agents after spending more than seven years in custody for a conviction that 
was later vacated after DNA testing proved his innocence.  Id. at 735.  
 228. Id. at 753. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 753–54 (recognizing that the absence of expert testimony describing how ex-
culpatory evidence was handled and lack of training provided “sufficient evidence to sur-
vive summary judgment on . . . failure to train allegations”). 
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In both cases, the Sixth Circuit applied the Canton single-incident 
liability theory to find that Brady violations did fit within that theory.231  
Further, in both cases, the Sixth Circuit correctly acknowledged that 
Canton demanded a factual analysis of the training program at is-
sue.232  Justice Thomas, however, failed to engage in such an analysis, 
and his opinion ignored both Sixth Circuit cases.233
B.  By Suggesting That a History of Brady Violations Was Insufficient to 
Establish a Pattern of Constitutional Violations Due to Dissimilar 
Types of Evidence, the Court Made It Unclear for Future Courts What 
Such a Pattern of Violations Would Look Like 
 
Justice Thomas also erred in ruling that Thompson could not 
prove a pattern of Brady violations despite the fact that Louisiana 
courts overturned four previous convictions prosecuted by Connick’s 
office because of Brady violations.234  Some have argued that this 
proposition does not comport with the reality of the pervasive mis-
conduct taking place in Connick’s office.235  Further, the Court has 
never tailored a Brady standard based on the type of evidence in-
volved.236
Justice Thomas demands that “[a] pattern of similar constitution-
al violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to dem-
  Therefore, Justice Thomas’s stipulation that only similar 
Brady evidence would be required to put Connick on notice has no 
basis in the Court’s Brady jurisprudence.   
 
 231. See Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 393; Gregory, 444 F.3d at 753–55 (applying the Canton sin-
gle-incident liability inquiry to the facts of the case).  See also Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 393 
n.19 (holding the municipality liable even though Moldowan neither alleged nor proved a 
pattern of constitutional violations). 
 232. Cf. Leading Cases, supra note 186, at 337 (“Following Canton, the question whether 
a need for training is ‘obvious’ thus involves probabilistic reasoning about the likelihood 
of injury given repeated iterations of certain scenarios . . . and the likelihood that officials 
will abide by constitutional requirements absent specific guidance.”). 
 233. See generally Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355–66 (2011) (failing to ana-
lyze the adequacy of the specific training program in Connick’s office and instead arguing 
for the proposition that lawyers generally receive good training). 
 234. Id. at 1360. 
 235. See Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas Writes One of the Meanest 
Supreme Court Decisions Ever, SLATE (April 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles 
/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual.html (“In the 10 
years preceding Thompson’s trial, Thomas acknowledges, ‘Louisiana courts had over-
turned four convictions because of Brady violations by prosecutors in Connick’s office.’  
Yet somehow this doesn’t add up to a pattern of Brady violations in the office, because the 
evidence in those other cases wasn’t blood or crime lab evidence.  Huh?”). 
 236. See supra Part II.D. 
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onstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”237  
The Court’s decision in Bryan County, however, specifically noted that 
a “pattern of injuries,” and not the strictly defined pattern of similar 
violations that Justice Thomas demands, would be “ordinarily neces-
sary to establish municipal culpability and causation.”238  In other 
words, so long as each of the previous Brady violations caused a consti-
tutional injury, the type of evidence withheld would be immaterial.239  
Further, it would seem that Justice Thomas construes “violation” too 
narrowly in Connick given that the four previous violations were simi-
lar in that they violated Brady’s duty to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence.240  Bringing the discussion on municipal liability back to its in-
tended function, Justice Ginsburg reminds the Court that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 never required a pattern of violations.241
This might seem like an insignificant distinction, but Justice 
Thomas bases his argument on a false notion that a single-incident 
liability inquiry into Brady violations requires a pattern of similar types 
of evidence.
 
242  However, what the Court actually envisioned in Bryan 
County was that Section 1983 failure-to-train liability required a pat-
tern of injuries.243  Justice Thomas accuses the dissent in Connick of mi-
sunderstanding the nuances of his argument,244 yet he misunders-
tands the nuances of the Court’s own language in prior decisions.245
 
 237. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (citing Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 
(1996)) (emphasis added). 
  
This misunderstanding is especially problematic when one considers 
the contradiction inherent in declaring that evidence of four Brady 
 238. Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). 
 239. Cf. id. (referencing a “violation of a specific constitutional or statutory right”). 
 240. See Complaint at 21, 22, Thompson v. Connick, 2005 WL 3541035, No. Civ.A.03-
2045 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2005) (detailing the history of misconduct in District Attorney 
Connick’s office).  “[I]t was reported that after being convicted and imprisoned in 1975, 
Gregory Bright and Earl Truvia recently were released from prison after their convictions 
were thrown out on account of the failure of prosecutors from the Orleans Parish District 
Attorney’s Office to turn over exculpatory evidence.”  Id. at 21 (citing No Retrial for Two 
Freed from Prison in 1975 Case, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, June 25, 2003, available at 2003 
WL 4877582).  On another occasion prosecutors in Connick’s office had “obtain[ed] the 
conviction and death sentence of [a] sixteen-year old defendant” by withholding exculpa-
tory evidence.  Id. at 21 (citing Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2003)).  
Thompson’s complaint reveals numerous sources that characterize Connick’s office as hav-
ing a reputation for misconduct with regard to exculpatory evidence.  Id. at 22. 
 241. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1386 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 242. See supra text accompanying note 237. 
 243. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
 244. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363–64 (describing the “nuance[d]” difference between 
the Brady training of police officers and prosecutors, and asserting that the dissent “misses 
the point”). 
 245. See supra text accompanying note 238.   
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violations does not constitute a pattern.246  If this is so, what would a 
pattern of Brady violations look like?  Justice Thomas does not offer a 
clear answer.247
C.  Because Determining “Deliberate Indifference” Requires a Fact-
Intensive Inquiry, the Court Should Not Have Disturbed the Jury’s 
Conclusion That the District Attorney’s Office Was Deliberately 
Indifferent to the Need for Brady Training 
  
In Canton, in which the Court announced the test for determin-
ing Section 1983 liability under a failure-to-train theory, the Court al-
so set the precedent, though not emphatically, that where lower 
courts applied the deliberate indifference test correctly, those particu-
lar judges and juries would be best equipped to decide, based on the 
facts, whether a municipality was deliberately indifferent in failing to 
train.248  In Connick, however, the Court broke from this precedent, 
and, finding no issue with whether the trial court correctly applied 
the deliberate indifference test, completely set aside the jury’s finding 
that Connick was deliberately indifferent to the need to train his 
prosecutors, even though the jury followed the correct deliberate in-
difference standard.249
Why did the Connick Court overlook this part of the Canton opi-
nion?  The answer is unclear, but a hint lies in Justice Scalia’s posi-
tions in both the Canton and Connick decisions.  In Canton, Justice Sca-
lia joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, which would have had the 
Court directly apply the deliberate indifference test to the facts of 
Canton to decide whether the municipality was indifferent to the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
   
250
 
 246. See Leading Cases, supra note 
  In Connick, Justice Thomas did just 
186, at 337–38 (“[B]y discounting the probative value 
of a single discovered violation, holding that recently proven violations of the same right 
do not provide notice unless the right was violated in a similar manner, and treating even 
cursory training as presumptively adequate, Connick erects a much higher barrier to recov-
ery than Canton contemplates for violations resulting from municipal decisions not to 
train.”). 
 247. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 248. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) (deciding that the task of evaluating 
the relationship between lack of training and a plaintiff’s injury was one for the judge and 
jury of the lower court).   
 249. See Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1365 (describing lower court reliance on evidence as “er-
roneous”); see also Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 861 (5th Cir. 2008) (determining 
that the trial court correctly elaborated the requirements of deliberate indifference that 
comported with the Supreme Court’s precedent).  The Fifth Circuit did not find reversible 
error in the trial court’s instructions.  Id. at 863. 
 250. Canton, 489 U.S. at 394 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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that, setting aside the jury’s determination251—which the majority in 
Canton would not have done.252
Justice Ginsburg provides “the more persuasive [opinion],”
 
253 
however, correctly noting that there was “no cause to upset” the jury’s 
verdict,254 which was based on abundant evidence that the District At-
torney’s office was deliberately indifferent to the need for Brady train-
ing.255  Guided by the trial court’s three part instruction,256 the jury 
reasonably concluded that Connick was deliberately indifferent.257  
Even after Justice Ginsburg revealed the long factual history of the 
prosecutors’ egregious constitutional violations and misunderstand-
ing of Brady,258 Justices Thomas and Scalia found it hard to see how 
Connick could be on notice that his prosecutors were ill-trained.259
 
 251. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366 (reversing the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, which 
upheld Thompson’s damage award from the district court). 
  
Some have posited that the only way Justices Thomas and Scalia could 
have portrayed the Louisiana District Attorney’s Office as having such 
 252. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 392 (ruling that whether the plaintiff was able to prove deli-
berate indifference was a matter for the lower court, as opposed to the Supreme Court). 
 253. Editorial, Failure of Empathy and Justice: The Court Refuses to See a Pattern of Abuse by 
Prosecutors Determined to Win at All Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A26.  See also Leading 
Cases, supra note 186, at 337 (calling the majority’s opinion “unpersuasive”). 
 254. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 255. Id. at 1370. 
 256. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
Deliberate indifference requires a showing of more than negligence or even 
gross negligence.  For liability to attach because of a failure to train, the fault 
must be in the training program itself, not in a particular prosecutor.  In order 
to find that the district attorney’s failure to adequately train, monitor, or super-
vise amounted to deliberate indifference, you must find that Mr. Thompson has 
proved each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence: 
First: The District Attorney was certain that prosecutors would confront the situa-
tion where they would have to decide which evidence was required by the Consti-
tution to be provided to an accused. 
Second: The situation involved a difficult choice, or one that prosecutors had a 
history of mishandling, such that additional training, supervision, or monitoring 
was clearly needed. 
Third: The wrong choice by a prosecutor in that situation will frequently cause a 
deprivation of an accused’s constitutional rights. 
Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 860 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 257. See id. at 861, 863 (concluding that the trial court correctly elaborated the re-
quirements of deliberate indifference that comported with the Supreme Court’s 
precedent, and finding no reversible error in the trial court’s deliberate indifference in-
struction). 
 258. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1371–87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 259. See id. at 1360 (majority opinion) (declaring that despite four previous Brady viola-
tions, Connick could not be “put on . . . notice” that his prosecutors needed “specific train-
ing”); id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that there was “no pattern of [Brady] vi-
olations” to put Connick “on notice”).  
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clean hands was “by willfully ignoring [the] entire trial record.”260  In 
fact, Justice Scalia was puzzled by the dissent’s “lengthy excavation of 
the trial record”261 as though one could determine deliberate indiffe-
rence without the aid of facts.262  In light of the prosecutors’ many vi-
olations, Justice Scalia’s confusion seems highly disingenuous.  In the 
end, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia’s misapplication of Sec-
tion 1983 jurisprudence263 “weakens . . . municipal liability” to the 
point of it being a historical relic with no teeth to bite into future acts 
of even the most egregious prosecutorial misconduct.264
Applying Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in her Canton dissent, if 
Thompson established that “the facts available to [Connick] put 
[him] on actual or constructive notice” that his prosecutors needed 
more or different Brady training, the District Attorney’s office would 
clearly be liable under Section 1983.
 
265  Even assuming that Thomp-
son could not hold the District Attorney’s office liable based on one 
Brady violation, the Court could have complied with Canton and re-
manded the case for a lower court to decide whether Thompson did 
establish a pattern of Brady violations.266
 
 260. Lithwick, supra note 
  
235. 
 261. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1366 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 262. The Canton Court acknowledged the difficulty of determining whether a munici-
pality’s failure to train was the cause of an alleged constitutional injury, but just as with 
other fact-intensive determinations, it concluded that a judge and jury were best suited to 
make such determinations.  Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). 
 263. See Leading Cases, supra note 186, at 338 (“The Court’s decision to constrict munic-
ipal liability more than precedent requires is particularly imprudent in light of § 1983’s 
purposes.  Connick displays an unalloyed emphasis on federalism and government efficien-
cy, but these are not the only principles that animate § 1983, the basic objective of which is 
to create remedies to effectuate rights, like Brady, that might otherwise be left vulnerable 
to abuse.  The Connick Court’s failure even to discuss compensation and deterrence—core 
implicit purposes of § 1983—thus constitutes both a flaw in its statutory analysis and a doc-
trinal sign of the times.” (citation omitted)). 
 264. Id. (“Connick . . . weakens the deterrence power of municipal liability by confining 
liability to those rare cases where the victim can prove a pattern of Brady violations.  Before 
Connick, the possibility of litigation and damages for a Brady violation attributable to in-
adequate training constituted one of the few liability-based threats hanging over district 
attorneys who otherwise might not have been adequately incentivized to invest resources 
in training.”).  See id. at 338–39 (“Discipline for violations remains virtually nonexistent.”).    
 265. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 396 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city policymakers 
put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially cer-
tain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens, the dictates of 
Monell are satisfied.”).   
 266. See id. at 391 (majority opinion) (“[J]udge and jury, doing their respective jobs, will 
be adequate to the task” of deciding whether failure-to-train liability should attach to a 
municipality.); id. at 392 (remanding to the lower court the deliberate indifference in-
quiry). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In Connick v. Thompson, the Supreme Court of the United States 
refined its municipal liability jurisprudence under the failure-to-train 
theory.267  By holding that a District Attorney’s office could not be 
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to train based on one 
Brady violation,268 the Court snatched Brady violations from the realm 
of single-incident liability the Court envisioned in Canton.269
Instead of providing clarity for lower courts, the Connick Court 
failed to establish what would constitute a pattern of Brady violations 
sufficient to trigger municipal liability.
   
270  Further, the Court turned 
its back on the many Brady violations the prosecutors committed and, 
because of this error, the Court improperly disturbed the jury’s rea-
sonable conclusion that untrained prosecutors’ Brady violations would 
likely deprive defendants of their constitutional rights.271  The Court 
missed the opportunity to ensure that municipalities would more vigi-
lantly train their prosecutors and guard against constitutional viola-
tions.272  Lastly, the Court should have stayed true to the Canton 
Court’s intent and held that prior Brady violations would put a prose-
cutor’s office on notice for the need to implement more training re-
gardless of differences in the types of evidence prosecutors withheld 
in those prior violations.273
 
 
 
 267. Id. at 1356. 
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